Enterprise security: validate and carry forward
- Source
- From the Staff AI System Design course
- By
- Sourav Banerjee
- Last updated
- 8 Nov 2026
Recall and Exit Gates
- What is trusted tenant scope? Verified identity plus current membership, never caller headers or model output.
- What does an audience constrain? Which service may consume a credential; service identity still needs action/resource scope.
- Why are policy age and token expiry separate? A still-valid identity assertion may outlive current access.
- What is safe in audit? Protected identifiers, action, decision and provenance metadata under controlled access; not raw bearer/source bodies.
- What is not demonstrated? Production OIDC, private routes, mTLS, secret storage, RLS and a global immediate revocation guarantee.
The 60-second card: verify identity; bind current scope; separate service and user authority; recheck resources; treat documents as data; commit audit; constrain secrets/egress; preserve unknown external outcomes. Review after about one, seven and 21 days.
- Explain identity, authorisation and disclosure boundaries without notes in two minutes.
- Draw gateway, service identity, current policy, retrieval, audit and egress boundaries.
- Defend pooled versus isolated tenants and public-constrained versus private provider access.
- Diagnose spoofing, stale policy, audit failure and wrong-audience credentials using concrete signals.
- Run/modify the signed-fixture and existing-retrieval integration tests; learner mastery remains unassessed.
Decisions and Next Pressure
ADR-006 and the stage snapshot preserve the actual teaching evidence.
A future T18.8 addresses authority lag, dependency outage, failover and duplicate effects without weakening these disclosure/audit rules. It must distinguish stale body reuse from stale authorisation. No security deployment or certification is claimed here.
Primary References
- RFC 8725: production JWT verification and audience/type-confusion boundaries; the fixture envelope is not its implementation.
- OWASP authorisation guidance: trusted per-resource least-privilege checks.
- OWASP prompt injection: untrusted content and model-control risks that retrieval alone does not remove.
Sources checked 2 November 2026. Policy ages, traffic and overhead are authored assumptions; executed checks and missing integrations are in validation.
Key Takeaways
- Trusted tenant scope is verified identity plus current membership, never caller headers or model output. An audience limits which service may consume a credential, and that service still needs action and resource scope.
- Policy age and token expiry are tracked separately because a still-valid identity assertion can outlive current access.
- Audit may hold protected identifiers, action, decision and provenance metadata under controlled access. It never holds raw bearer tokens or source bodies.
- Production OIDC, private routes, mTLS, secret storage, row-level security and a global immediate revocation guarantee are not demonstrated by the local fixtures.